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Image, word and the antiquity of ruins
Ahuvia Kahane*
Department of Classics and Philosophy and the Humanities and Arts Research Centre,
Royal Holloway, University of London, UK
This paper considers the ruin as a special genre of representation involving special
objects. The paper examines the temporality of the ruin, the mediality of the ruin –
especially the relation between image and word – and the historical positioning of the
idea of the ruin in relation to antiquity and the modern era. The author analyzes aspects
of the basic visual and phenomenological “grammar” of the ruin and comments on
some of the implications for our understanding of the representation of history and
historical change. The ruin’s “deep sense of voicefullness” (as Ruskin calls it) is
conveyed precisely through the silence of the material remains (and hence also their
quality as images). The ruin, the paper argues, is as much an ancient idea as it is a
product of modernity, but it allows us, paradoxically, both to understand times other
than our own and to maintain historical difference and to keep a distance from the past.
Keywords: antiquity; Aristotle; Babel; Benjamin, Walter; Bracciolini, Poggio;
Deleuze, Gilles; Foucault, Michel; Gibbon, Edward; Homer; Kiefer, Anselm; Ovid;
Rome; ruins; San Gimignano; Strabo; Suda; Troy; Twin Towers
Language has unmistakably made plain that memory is not an instrument for exploring the
past, but rather a medium. It is a medium of that which is experienced, just as the earth is the
medium in which ancient cities lie buried.
Walter Benjamin1
The ruin is a material thing and a visible object – the remains, for instance, of a building
that has suffered damage or decay. But the ruin is also a narrative of sorts.2 Objects always
have stories to tell: What are they? How were they made? Why are they here? Often we
ignore such questions and the histories they hide. Life would come to a halt if we
interrogated every object in our sight. Yet ruins seem to be very special objects, and their
history, especially if we do not know it, seems to persist in its explicitness.3 It demands, as
it were, a telling, even as almost every ruin tells the same ‘generic’ story: a narrative of
change ‘from better to worse’.
There are many ways of characterising this story. In Aristotelian terms, for example,
we could describe the change of fortunes as a peripeteia. If we allow that such a change
can inspire ‘pity and fear’, we may perhaps also view their effect as a ‘catharsis of such
emotions’, and as a source of ‘tragic pleasure’. Thus – even as we take our very first
glance – it would appear that the ruin partakes of complex narrative forms, here, in a
formal sense, of the ‘tragic’.4 From this perspective, the ruin seems to be a kind of muthos
in material form, a narrative without words, a special kind of ‘imitation of an action’
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(mimesis praxeoˆs) with – as Aristotle would have it – a ‘beginning’ (for example, the
assumed construction of a building), a ‘middle’ (perhaps conflict or neglect), and an ‘end’,
(the phase of decay).5
There are various obstacles to a ‘generic’ reading of this sort. Ruins may eventually
inspire pleasure, but they are not normally made as imitations for pleasure. As a matter of
principle, and with the exception, for example, of some architectural follies, ruins do not
have a ‘poet’, a maker or an ‘author’:6 They are the result of contingent contradictory
forces and intentions, personal, social, natural and perhaps divine.7 They are not quite
tragedies in stone.
Space will not permit us to consider an ‘Aristotelian’ reading of the ruin in detail, and
it is not our purpose to do so in this essay. Some points relating to Aristotle will re-surface
further below, but the main purpose of this brief opening discussion is to underscore the
basic terms of our enquiry: the ruin as visual object is also a form of discourse. It is a
special genre of representation in which we must allow for tangled elective affinities
between image and word. In this essay I wish to explore some aspects of this difficult point
as well as its implications for our understanding of the representation of history, historical
change and – what is particularly important in the context of the ruin – the interface
between ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’.
The ruin’s formal associations with discourse are not always stated up front, but they
are ubiquitous. For example, Ovid, in his canonical, eponymous narrative of change says
(Metamorphoses 15. 420–30):
. . . we see times change,
and these nations acquiring power
and those declining. So Troy, that was so great in men and riches,
and for ten years of war could give so freely of her blood,
is humbled [humilis ], and only reveals ancient ruins [ruinas ] now,
and, for wealth, ancestral tombs.
Sparta was famous [clara ], great Mycenae flourished,
and Cecrops’s citadel of Athens, and Amphion’s Thebes.
Sparta is worthless soil [vile solum ], proud Mycenae is fallen [cecidere ],
and what is the Thebes of Oedipus but a name [nisi nomina ],
what is left of the Athens of Pandion, but a name [nisi nomen ]?8
Past glory and present decay here mark two distinct points on an axis of narrative time.9
Change is highlighted in several ways: in economic terms and through a form of ‘visual’
transition, as a move from visible object to discourse and word. Great cities have become
‘worthless soil’. What was once famous, or rather clarus, ‘visible and prominent’, is now
only a ‘name’. Tall citadels of the past now lie ‘low’.
It would seem, then, that underlying this narrative of metamorphosis from object to
word is an almost geometrical move from the vertical to the horizontal. From tall
buildings, to low ground. This move, or image, seems to capture graphically a distinct
view of the ruin as the mark of ‘downfall’, as a representation of the ravages of time and
fortune. This view is commonly associated with antiquity and is also often expressed by
antiquarians, for example. Edward Gibbon, a great exponent of the narrative of decline and
fall, speaks of it when he cites Poggio Bracciolini’s de Varietate Fortunae (The
Vicissitudes of Fate). Speaking of Rome, Poggius says:
This spectacle of the world how is it fallen! How chanced! How defaced! The path of victory
is obliterated by vines, and the benches of the senators are concealed by a dunghill. . . . the
vacant space is interrupted only by ruins and gardens [my emphasis].10
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Here again, then, is an ‘ancient’ view of the ruin as that which marks a ‘fall’ from heights.
The ruin is the decomposed (‘dunghill’) remains of things which no longer exist and which
in this sense are ‘obliterated’ and ‘concealed’, and thus invisible.
But, can we really attach the historical tag ‘ancient’ to this view? If nothing else,
Gibbon and Poggio are, in fact, modern figures. To be an antiquarian and to be ancient are
two different things. Is their view of the ruin ‘ancient’ or ‘modern’? Are Gibbon and
Poggio anachronistic figures living in the past? This is hardly likely. What, then, does
modernity bring to their perception of the ruin?
It is often argued that, in direct contrast to the ‘ancient’ view and to the ‘invisibility’ of
the ruin in antiquity, modernity has placed the ruin at the centre of vision. One needs only
look to such modern monuments as the ruins of the Frauenkirche in Dresden or the
Geda¨chniskirche in Berlin (discussed elsewhere in this volume) to see that modernity
elevates the ruin to a position of extreme visibility.11 Poggio’s own text, when read
carefully, seems to suggest exactly this. ‘The vacant space’, he says, ‘is interrupted only by
ruins and gardens.’ Both ruins and gardens are highly visible, living elements of the
landscape of the present. Such visibility may nevertheless indicate that both the nature of
the ruin and its historical position are rather complex. To see why, let us consider a further
example.
At a show in Paris in 2007, artist Anselm Kiefer exhibited a piece entitled ‘Chute
d’e´toiles’ comprising twin falling concrete towers.12 The core of the piece seems to need
little explanation, or even an image. We all know the story. The piece was, nevertheless,
accompanied by an audio guide, something that at first might seem like a surfeit of words.
‘We all know,’ says Kiefer, ‘that one day everything will collapse.’ He adds: ‘I already see
the grass growing over New York.’13
Surfeit and excess are, of course, important modern critical principles.14 Kiefer’s
excess of words points, obliquely, to an underlying truth: his ruin is, in fact, not in the past,
as one might expect, but (interestingly, using a perfective present tense, ‘I already see’)
partly in the future. Furthermore, green grass, normally an iconic image of regeneration
and growth, is here, strangely, a great city’s sign of decay.15
Kiefer’s work is focused on the question of history and the past, on the memory of
destruction (the World Trade Center) and the process of decay and disappearance. But his
words suggest that the ruin appears exposed before our eyes, at home, where we live, at a
place and a moment in the present, a moment in which both the past and its tall, grey fallen
towers, and the low-lying green grass of the future are ‘visible’. ‘I already see . . . ’ he says.
This conception of extreme, perhaps total visibility is simple, yet bewildering. Kiefer sees
the ruin as something other than matter. He sees vision as something other than optics. He
sees time as something other than a linear progression. These are views often associated
with modernity in general. They are also views often regarded as largely foreign to
antiquity.
To exclude these views from antiquity is not entirely unreasonable. Consider for
example the idea of time as a linear sequence. Aristotle, speaks, in the fourth book of the
Physics, of time as the number (arithmos) of change (kineˆsis), and thus of time as a linear
movement (T1 . . .T2 . . .T3 . . .Tn).16 We can link this view directly, for example, to his
prescriptive formulation in the Poetics of narrative (muthos) as an ‘organic’ (kata physin)
structure and as a linear sequence that is characterised by a beginning (‘T1’), a middle
(‘T2’) and an end (‘T3’).17 Unlike modernity, Aristotle, and antiquity, could only grasp
time as a linear progression. At the same time, as we have already seen, the
phenomenology of the ruin suggests a distinctly ‘Aristotelian’ tragic narrative, the ruin as
a silent narrative with a beginning, middle, and end, a narrative which has no words, but
European Review of History—Revue europe´enne d’histoire 831
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which can nevertheless be seen.18 Not only the nature of the ruin, then, but also its position
in history and its historical characterisation require further explanation.
The view expressed by Kiefer wherein time breaks free, as it were, of its linear order,
and where the ruin is visible beyond what lies before our eyes, is, as we have already
noted, closely associated with historical conceptions of the present day. As, for example,
the editors of a recent collection of essays entitled Ruins of Modernity note:
. . . catastrophe [i.e., the ruin], real and imagined, underpins modernity’smultilayered sense of
history [my emphasis].19
The catalogue to an important exhibition on ruins at the Getty Museum puts this even more
explicitly, ‘ruins are the product of modernity’:
In ancient times, the past was freely used as the foundation for subsequent building or, if too
sacred to be discarded, was often buried. At least since the Renaissance, however, ruins have
occupied a central position in our collective imagination, provoking reactions ranging from
nostalgia to foreboding, from dreams of grandeur to fears of mortality.20
The point in these and many similar views, of course, is not to preclude the existence of
decaying buildings, ‘ruins’, from antiquity. Ovid’s passage from the Metamorphoses is
well known. References to ruins abound elsewhere in ancient poetry, prose, travel-guides
and other works.21 Yet in antiquity the ruin – so the story goes – is often little more than
an emptiness that marks downfall and the ravages of time. It is the invisible mark of a well-
ordered ‘end’ which, as we noted, follows a prominent beginning and the ‘reversal of
fortune’ ( peripeteia) affected by the middle. Not only in Ovid, but in many other ancient
sources, ruins per se seem to be swiftly glossed over as the narrative moves on to recount
the ‘visible’ glory of their pasts. The great travel writer Pausanias, for examples, says:
‘The sanctuary of Asclepius I found in ruins, but it was originally built by a private person
. . . ’ and so on (Paus. 10.38.13). When Strabo the Geographer visits the site of Ilium, he
cites Homer and other sources and describes the past glory of Troy at length. The place
itself, as he says plainly, is empty. There is nothing to see (Geog. 13.1.38.1–5):
No trace [ichnos] of the ancient city has survived [soˆzetai]. This might be expected, for the
cities around were devastated, but not entirely destroyed, whereas when Troy was overthrown
from its foundation all the stones were removed for the reparation of the other cities [my
emphasis].22
A clear-cut characterisation of ‘ancient’ and ‘modern’ offers the tempting prospect of
historical order. We must allow, however – I will not argue this point in detail here – that
such periodisation and a sharp differentiation of historical mindsets bear something of
modernity’s authoritarian rhetoric of progress, its narrative self-fashioning as a breaking-
free from the tyranny of the past, as well as the more sinister overtones which such ideas
sometimes carried.23 Neat taxonomy also belies the irrepressible historical resonance and
complexity of the ruin and, I submit, obscures the advantages that such resonance can
bring to an understanding of history.
Consider, for example, that when Ovid, or Pausanias, or Strabo, see nothing but ‘empty
space’ in front of their eyes, they also ‘see’ the glory of the past in words. In its most
straightforward sense, this is what the ancientsmeant by the rhetorical figure of ekphrasis;24
it is also close to what Horace in the Ars Poetica (361) famously speaks of when he says ut
pictura poiesis. Such ‘ancient’ vision is not entirely different from the ‘modern’ vision that
allows Anselm Kiefer to see grass growing in the future over New York.
The implication of the above is that clear-cut historical differentiation is at best
questionable. Not surprisingly, the editors of the volume Ruins of Modernity, for example,
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having pointed to the link between modernity’s ‘multilayered sense of history’ and the
ruin, add that
. . . ruins can bear witness to, but can also idealize or undermine, modernity’s asynchronous
temporalities.25
In other words, to localise such temporalities in modernity is an idealising gesture (which
can undermine modernity’s temporalities). This summary caveat merely restates seminal
formulations of the problem of history in modernity, none perhaps better known than
Walter Benjamin’s description of the angel of history, the angelus novus (after Paul Klee):
His [the angel’s] face is turned toward the past. Where we perceive a chain of events, he sees
one single catastrophe which keeps piling wreckage upon wreckage . . . But a storm is
blowing from Paradise . . . This storm propels him into the future to which his back is turned,
while the pile of debris before him grows skyward.26
We need only point out that the ‘catastrophe’ which from this perspective underlies the
perception of an ordered ‘chain of events’ (T1, T2, T3 . . .Tn), must also displace – among
everything else – the ‘ordered’ historical position of modernity itself. Where time, or the
chain of events is ‘a pile of debris’ (in other words, ‘a ruin’) the historical divide between
modernity and its pasts may itself be reduced to rubble. This pronounced late-modern view
seems to admit a new image of the ruin into the realm of antiquity. Furthermore, if this
‘new’ image of the ruin exists in antiquity, then perhaps it is not as ‘new’ as we might
otherwise imagine, but, to the contrary, quite ‘old’. In other words, new ruins may be
found in the past, and the past may be found in new ruins.
Can we really read such modern views, such implied anachronism, into the ancient
past? Let us look at another example. Its source is the Byzantine encyclopaedia known as
the Suda.
Note first that, like all encyclopaedias and perhaps unlike both the Metamorphoses’
poetic text and Anselm Kiefer’s artistic production (but more like Pausanias and Strabo),
the Suda is not a high-flown meditation on change. It is a more practical attempt to
preserve the past in the form of a fixed ‘archive’. Also, unlike Ovid, whose personal
history is famous (not least from his own poems), or Kiefer, who is a celebrity, the author
of the Suda is unknown except by the name of Suidas, which most scholars now agree is a
misreading of the title of his book. ‘Suidas’, we might say, is the personified image of a
general ancient position. It is not a private perspective.27 Finally, the ruins we are about to
see are not the remains of glorious citadels. They do not carry with them the dramatic
Gibbonean narrative of downfall. Their story is and seems to have always been unknown –
one of those we never interrogate in ordinary life. In this sense, they are perhaps
‘invisible’. Yet it is precisely this veneer – as we shall see, it is a veneer – of the ordinary
that lends the Suda’s example its strength.
In the Suda, then, under the letter nu, we find a short entry for nuktikorax, the long-
eared owl, which, as our encyclopedia explains, is ‘is a kind of solitary [ereˆmikos ] bird’:
It shuns places of habitation and instead seeks ruined [ereˆmois ] and abandoned
[katalelumenais ] dwellings. For ‘ruins’ [ereipia ] is what they call the sites on which
houses once stood [oikopeda ]. Likewise the sparrow [strouthion ], a sad [deilon ]
bird . . . 28
At first glance, this example seems to embody the same ‘ancient’ conception of the ruin
and especially its visual attributes. The Greek word ereipia,‘ruins’ is derived from the
verb ereipoˆ: ‘throw or dash down, tear down’. As in Ovid, the ruin seems to be a sad,
worthless, and thus desert space. Great or small, this landscape is a horizontal,
European Review of History—Revue europe´enne d’histoire 833
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featureless, and in this sense ‘invisible’ emptiness. It marks – as before – downfall and
the ravages of well-ordered time. It marks the place ‘on which houses once stood’.
Yet a seemingly small puzzle emerges from the text. The Suda says that the
nuktikorax is a ‘solitary’ bird. The Greek adjective used here, ereˆmikos, means ‘of or for
solitude, living in a desert’, a cognate of ereˆmia, ‘desert’, ‘wilderness’. If this solitary
creature seeks a desert, what need, we may ask, does it have of ‘ruined’ or ‘abandoned’
dwellings or, indeed, of any kind of formerly lived-in abode? Why does this bird seek
‘sites on which houses once stood’? And why does this animal seek distinctly human
remnants?
A little like Anselm Kiefer, the Suda too seems to say too much. Yet let me suggest
that this surplus points, as before, to larger and more complex truths. Why does the owl
care for ruins? In fact, it does not (science tells us that the long-eared owl prefers to nest in
coniferous trees and thickets). The passage has little or nothing to do with ornithology. As
has been long recognised, it belongs to a totally different tradition of discourse and
thought.29 Verbal echoes and a strong proximity of tone suggest that we must read the
passage in relation to one of the strongest generic expressions of lament, in relation, almost
bewilderingly, to Biblical ruins, and with specific attention to the book of Psalms (101
[102 Masoretic text].7–8):30
I am like a desert [ereˆmikoˆs ] owl, like an owl [nuktikorax ] among the ruins [en oikoˆpedoˆi].
I lie awake; I have become like a bird [strouthion ] alone [monazoˆn ] on a roof.31
We are dealing it would seem not with animals or empirical facts, but with distinctly
human emotions, with discursive genres and poetic intertexts. The object underlying the
Psalmist’s lament is unspecified and invisible. Yet in its ‘original’ Judaic form at least, in
the Hebrew version of the text which lies ‘underneath’ the Septuagint’s Greek version, it is
impossible that any song of lament (no matter when it was originally composed) which
speaks of ‘ruins’ should invoke, of course, anything but the City of Jerusalem, the ruin of
ruins and ‘the city of eternal exile’, which is one of the most resonant ruins in the tradition
of the West. This unspecified Jerusalem is a ‘pile of debris’ to match Mycenae, Rome,
Troy or perhaps even New York.32 The Suda’s humble entry thus lies atop an intractable
stratigraphy of oblique receptions and a virtual Babel of cultural, linguistic, social,
religious values and historical layers – from the Biblical Hebrew source and the
Septuagint, to a Byzantine reworking, from the Psalmist’s lament and the Hebraic
tradition, through its Alexandrian permutations, through Christianity to the lexicon’s
archive and thus back to the ancient, Pagan world – a ‘multilayered sense of history’ in the
most immediate sense. Although the Suda’s use of the Bible as a source is known, we
could not, and probably would not ever want to reduce the relations between these texts to
a linear historical sequence of direct allusions and citations.33 It is impossible to tell this
story as an ‘organic’ (Aristotelian) narrative with a ‘beginning’, ‘middle’ and ‘end’.
Amidst such far-flung intertextuality and multilayered traditions, what is clear is that
the Suda’s non-human subject in a short, practical entry which is part of a well-ordered,
alphabetical compendium of facts, has become the vicarious bearer of a distinctly human
sentiment, a being that lives in a time that is not a straight line, an embodiment of the idea
of exile, diaspora, and of loss as a way of life. All these sentiments are focused, of course,
on the material image of the ruin. Our example hints, clearly, but from an unknown
distance, at what we might call an essential solitude or ‘homelessness’ or indeed simply ‘a
sense of ruins’.34
This is hardly a sense of ruin as plain downfall which, as we have noted, is associated
with antiquity and with a representation of the ravages of time. It is, in fact, somewhat
A. Kahane834
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closer to the sense of homelessness which is at the core of the experience of modernity.35
Such homelessness and the Suda’s ruins are not an emptiness. They are not ‘worthless’
empty space. We have already seen that there is nothing essential about the substance of
the ruin. Green grass can be the mark of destruction. If we recall Poggio’s description of
Rome, he too invokes, paradoxically, image of exuberant growth and life in the form of
vines and gardens as marks of decay. We can perhaps turn this around now: the Suda’s
ancient ruins too, whatever their material substance, are, paradoxically, not a ‘desert’.
They are not flat, empty ‘invisible’ space, even as they are destroyed. These ruins are the
nuktikorax’s ordinary ‘home’, the site of its everyday life. The owl has not lost its abode.36
Its home has not been destroyed. Quite the opposite: it is seeking a home. Indeed, this
home can never be ‘destroyed’, because it is by its nature a site of destruction (in this
sense, one cannot ruin the ruin).
And yet, as we have already noted, the nyktikorax seeks a home in specifically human
dwellings. Such dwellings, whether ruined or not, can never be the proper home of a bird
or an animal, and are thus not a ‘true home’. Owls and other birds do not really feel
‘sadness’ or the existential melancholia of loss. Owls are not songbirds, and they do not
sing psalms of lament for Jerusalem. Unless, of course, they are the creation of human
consciousness and the symbol of larger things.37
Let us recapitulate: the Suda’s passage brings to light a multilayered stratigraphy and a
sentiment of essential displacement, diaspora, or ‘homelessness’, embodied in the material
form of the ruin and its ‘archaeology’. This perception of the ruin seems entirely different
from the perception we have described earlier in our passage from Ovid. It is, I submit,
closer to the condition of modernity and to characterisations of modern historical
consciousness, its ‘melancholia’, the subject sundered from the world and from itself, the
subject’s ‘homelessness’, and so on.38
We need, however, to understand this idea of diaspora, and its relation to the ruin, to
the process of decay and to our examples a little better. As we have seen, the nuktikorax’s
‘homelessness’ is anchored it its quest for alien, human habitation. The Suda’s owl is not
so much an animal as an animal figuration of human sentiment, a creature at odds with its
own nature. If this is true, then perhaps the habitation it seeks, although a fallen ruin
(ereipia), is likewise at odds with its own nature, not simply a visible pile of debris, but a
much more elaborate construction that is an essential sentiment of ruins, like the
Psalmist’s thoughts and words. The Suda’s ruins then are much closer to discourse. Yet in
this, they seem to realign with the ruins in Ovid, the poet par excellence of the life of exile,
which are ‘only a name’. This realignment may suggest that the transmission in Ovid from
material, or world, or visible image, to word or name, to something invisible, is not –
melancholy as it is – the destructive act that a prima facie reading of the Metamorphoses
might suggest. A second glance will show how obvious, indeed conventional this idea is.
As is widely recognised, Ovid’s own life in exile is a life of ruin.39 But it is a life,
indeed a life of words, highly visible, transferrable, almost imperishable. Also, more
specifically to our passage, when Ovid speaks of the past glory of Troy as ‘mere names’,
especially when he is doing so in hexameter verse, the eponymous medium of epic poetry
(the technical term in Greek is epos), he means more than he says. In epic poetry, the fall of
a visible city or the death of a hero and their decay into ‘invisible’ words is no decay at all.
To the contrary, it is precisely the Homeric idea of kleos aphthiton, ‘imperishable fame’.40
This is the general poetic principle of epic song: Troy’s eternal visibility and the
immortality of heroes are acquired in the conversion of the visible world into words of
fame.41
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Amidst such visibility, we realise again that the sequence of ‘beginning-middle-end’
which Aristotelian muthos traces in words is not a suitable image of time or of the
transitions from great city or citadel to ruin. The transition from ‘visible reality’ to
‘invisible word’ or the geometric transition from an upright vertical position to a prostrate
horizontal one is likewise not a simple act of change from ‘a’ to ‘b.’ It is not simply an act
of disappearance, decay, or downfall.42 The changes are an essential interaction between
inextricable elements, without which, we might almost say, history, and time itself would
end, or disappear. To see flat landscape and to hear no words, not to know the names or the
narratives of its indistinguishable parts, is to not know that, for example, the high citadel of
Troy ever existed. Without the element of discourse, narrative and time, there is,
paradoxically, nothing out there but a pile of debris or ‘the desert of the real’.43
This point is highly abstract. But it is also something we can see, literally, in a picture
(Figure 1). Not one stone is overturned. No puff of smoke is in sight. It is a perfect image,
in which the Manhattan skyline stands upright and intact. Yet, to repeat my point about
Troy, this time turned around and applied to the most iconic vertical landscape of
modernity, unless we live outside of history and time, it is clear that this image also shows
other, ‘invisible’ things and tells a narrative. It is, as Anselm Kiefer might say, a picture of
Figure 1. The Twin Towers (World Trade Center, New York).
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a ruin. Furthermore, unless we imagine ourselves in some form of time without change (an
imperium sine fine, ‘a thousand years’ Reich’, Benjamin’s ‘homogenous, empty time’), we
know, with Kiefer, that every building must aspire to its own collapse.44 This verbal and
visual oxymoron is by no means exclusive to modernity. It is also part and parcel of the
ancient world, and part of the vocabulary of antiquity. For example, in Homer, the
canonical text par excellence of antiquity, one of the most prominent formulaic (and hence
traditional) expressions for destruction, an expression applied to both individuals and
cities, is aipus olethros, ‘sheer destruction’. Here too, is an oxymoron. The idea of collapse
and downfall is inseparable from the image of dizzying vertical heights.45 This idea also
embodies the temporality and historicity of the ruin: if destruction is always already
inscribed in the building itself, then, to the degree that history, time, and change exist
(in other words, if all things decay and collapse), the ruin is both fragile and contingent,
and, curiously ‘timeless’.46 Nowhere is this idea more vividly attested – as we might
perhaps already realise – than in the specific form of the tower and some of its contingent
historical examples, both modern and ancient, to which, in this final part of our discussion
we must now turn.
Let us begin with what is arguably ‘the mother of all towers’ and one of its most
prominent examples (strangely situated in what is today Iraq, the centre of the modern
conflict that brought down the Twin Towers) the Tower of Babel (Figure 2):47
To grasp the force of the Tower of Babel as ruin we must take a look at the words of
Genesis 11, where the story is told, and in particular at three of its key attributes: the visual
contrast of vertical and horizontal elements; the amalgamation of image and word; and
finally, the conflation of tower and city or tower and world at-large.
Consider first the visual image. Earlier in the narrative of Genesis, the Flood reduced
the world to a featureless horizon (water seeks flatness by nature!) The survivors of the
Figure 2. Peter Breugel the Elder, “The Tower of Babel,” 1563.
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flood now dwell in a low, flat plain (Heb. bika, ‘valley’, ‘rift’), but they all speak the same
language and strive as one upwards, building a tall tower (Heb. migdal, something that
‘grows big/tall’; root, g-d-l) that will ‘reach the heavens’.48 The tower will prevent the
people from being ‘scattered (Heb. nafutz) abroad upon the face of the whole earth’, in
other words, from being reduced yet again to a state of horizontal ‘flatness’.49 God
descends (Heb. vayered) from above. Fearing the excess of man’s united will and
humanity’s common language, he resolves to go down (Heb. nerda), to confute (navla)
this language and to stop the tower’s rise. The builders scatter, construction stops and the
narrative ends.
The text of Genesis nevertheless offers – like Kiefer’s or the Suda’s – a supplement,
here in the form an aetion which seals the visual image of something scattered and flat, but
likewise transforms it into a word (11.9):
Therefore is the name of it is called Babel, because the Lord did there confound [balal ] the
language of all the earth, and from thence did the Lord scatter them abroad upon the face of all
the earth [my emphasis].
The name Babel and the verb balal, ‘confound’ are cognate (Semitic root b-l-l). The aetion
binds the scattering of the Tower’s builders and the confuting of their language by means
of and within the Tower’s name. Further emphasis of the analogy between confuting
language and physical scattering is given by the anaphora ‘ . . . the language of all of the
earth . . . scatter them upon the face of all the earth’ ( . . . kol haaretz . . . kol haaretz).50
This double ‘horizontal’ fragmentation counters the vertical aspiration of the Tower as an
act of man’s will. Yet the same fragmentation also preserves the tower for eternity in the
name of Babel. This also seems to be exactly what the builders of the Tower had wanted.
One might expect that the purpose of a tower whose top ‘reaches the heavens’ is to save the
sons of Noah from another Flood. In fact, the builders’ stated objective is to ‘make
ourselves a name’ (naaseh lanu shem).
At the beginning of this essay we spoke of the ruin as ‘a muthos in material form’. We
saw this echoed in Ovid’s idea of ruin as name and elsewhere. Here, it seems to me, we
find a similar argument. The Tower is the material form of its name.51
This brief analysis suggests something of the visage and of the integrated ‘mediality’
of the Tower of Babel as image and word. There is, however, one more pointed rhetorical
twist to the narrative which is important for our understanding of the ruin. The story of the
Tower of Babel is, in fact, the story of the City of Babel. Genesis’ carefully crafted
narrative says (11. 4):
And they [the sons of Noah] said, Go to, let us build us a city and a tower [my emphasis] . . .
At no point does the Biblical text speak of the Tower on its own. Rather, using the
rhetorical trope of hendiadys, the ‘one idea by means of two words’, it marks the overlap
of City and Tower. The figure is repeated two verses later when we are told that God
descends to see ‘the city and the tower’ (11.6). In fact, the text never describes the
destruction of the Tower per se. Its final words (before the aetion) are ‘and they [mankind]
left off to build the city’ (11. 8). What begins, then, as pointed hendiadys develops in the
course of the narrative into a full blown synekdoche and a relation of metonymy which is
of crucial importance for the inherent ambition embedded in the Tower and for the
Tower’s function as representation.
It is not hard to see that these elements, the geometrical visage, the special relation of
image and word and the relation of metonymy between tower and city are also attested,
with important and meaningful contingent variations, in almost every other tower, and in
the tower-as-ruin. The Leaning Tower of Pisa, for example, always at the point of collapse,
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clearly ‘overlaps’ its city, as does the Pharos of Alexandria, one of the seven wonders of
the ancient world of which only underwater traces now exist. Yet it seems to me that one of
the best examples of a tower displaying these elements, each inextricably wound up with
the others, is one that accompanies this essay from the start, the World Trade Center. Let
us briefly consider it again.52
This large complex was a ‘city within a city’ and thus a metonymy of the city. Yet the
Twin Towers’ metonymy resides even more distinctly, I submit, in their basic form, and in
the very image which (somewhat like the tower of Babel), of course, is also their name, the
Twin Towers.
A single tower is a long, vertical element. Georg Simmel is right to interpret this as a
representation of the upwards thrust of human will.53 But can one aspire to more? The
World Trade Center’s architect Minoru Yamasaki wanted his design to reflect ‘man’s
ability to find greatness’. His clients were corporate masters, of course, not the masses. He
feared that a group of several towers may ‘look too much like a housing project (sic!)’ and
would thus project an insufficiently imperious image.54 His solution was to build two
towers.
Two towers, let me suggest, like two vertical lines, mark not only an upwards thrust,
but a horizontal axis, too (Figure 3). They thus mark, with perfect ‘geometric’ economy,
the whole of the horizon: up, down and sideways. More than the will of man, two towers
mark, let me suggest, modern man’s will to possess all that he surveys, and perhaps even
all that lies beyond (unsurveyable heights) and which cannot be seen.
We could thus describe this as ‘an image of excess’, a modern image of hybris and also
of catastrophe, the point of ‘a turning downwards’.55 Furthermore, this is not just a matter
of geometry and abstraction, but of material architecture and contingent images (Figure 4).
We can now also see that the Twin Towers, in the essence of their form, stand
metonymically for the one City as a whole. They are, let me suggest, a geometric trope, a
visual analogue to the Biblical hendiadys, the rhetorical figure which expresses ‘one idea
by two words’ and which conflates ‘the City’ (and in this sense ‘all the earth’) and ‘the
Tower’.56
ay by
ax bx
Figure 3.
Figure 4.
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Weall know thatNewYork and its towers are symbols ofmodernity’s excess. One needs
only to consider, for example, how many futuristic disaster movies, The Day After
Tomorrow, (2012), 2012 (2009), Deep Impact (1998), Armageddon (1998) and more, rely
on precisely this cityscape and its destruction for their plot and often also for the metaphor/
image of their opening or closing scenes.57 But, as we have already pointed out, the
association of the ruin with modernity and its exclusion from the ancient world is mistaken.
This holds true, I submit, in precise contingent detail, in the case of the tower-as-ruin too.
Consider the following images circa 1929 in postcards from the archives of Walter
Benjamin, who, as we have seen, is one of the ‘authors’ of modernity’s conception of both
the ruin and of modernity ‘itself’ (Figure 5).58
Here, then, is another image of the ‘City’. The caption reads San Gimignano:
Panorama dal Poggio, ‘a view from the hill’.59 The ancient town of San Gimignano, is, of
course, best known for, indeed almost synonymous with its thirteenth-century towers,
many times destroyed, but now restored to their full height (Figure 6).
This second postcard clearly shows three towers. But the essence of the image, beyond
doubt, is the number two. The caption, the name of the image, reads, ‘Le due Torre
Salvucci’, ‘the two towers of the Salvucci family’.
We have already seen, in the words of Poggio and Kiefer, that the same object, ‘grass’,
‘a garden’, ‘vines’, can be both the sign of life and a mark of decay. We have likewise seen
that the movement of historical time, ‘real’ time, cannot be restricted to a linear, numerical
progression. These two sets of images of New York and San Gimignano, combined into
one (a visual hendiadys) are, I submit, a literal ‘picture’ of these arguments. They tell us
that images and names that are ‘exactly the same’ – the old and the new, can still, ‘at the
same time’, be vastly different in terms of history, geography, language, ethics, and
politics. They teach us that every building, no matter how complete, is a manifestation of
excess and is thus, also, inherently, a ruin. The Ruin is present in a building, even when a
building is intact, even when the destruction is not to be seen, even when a building is
described or remembered in words.
Figure 5. San Gimignano-Panorama dal Poggio. Walter Benjamini’s Archive: Images, Texts,
Signs, 177.
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Michael Roth, Clare Lyons and Charles Merewether, the editors of Irresistible Decay:
Ruins Reclaimed, are thus mistaken to suggest that ‘ruins are the product of modernity’.
They likewise misconceive the historicity of the ruin and its invisibility in antiquity when
they suggest that ‘in ancient times, the past was freely used as the foundation for
subsequent building or, if too sacred to be discarded, was often buried’.60 In modernity
ruins do, of course, occupy ‘a central position in our collective imagination’. 61 There is no
question that some of antiquity’s famous ruins are the subject of modernity’s intensive
gaze. The Parthenon, for example, having survived ancient wars and more-recent Venetian
cannonballs, is now being restored to its perfect glory, yet it will, of course always remain
‘a ruin’. What is mistaken is to exclude the ruin from antiquity. As I have tried to argue, the
‘antiquity’ of ruins denotes, not merely the ‘visibility’ of the past in the present, but,
paradoxically, its ‘visibility’ within that very past. The stones of the past may be ‘recycled’
for other uses or buried in the ground away from sight, but the ruin in antiquity is a medium
(recycled stones are literally, a ‘medium’) used, like memory, for its own sake: it is ‘that
Figure 6. San Gimignano - Palazzo Pescidini e le due Torri Salvvcci. Walter Benjamin’s Archive:
Images, Texts, Signs, 177.
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which is experienced’, like the ‘earth’, as Walter Benjamin in the epigraph to our essay
suggests, ‘in which ancient cities lie buried’.
Nowhere, it seems to me, is this more evident than in the most prominent ruin in
antiquity which, already by Strabo’s time was not to be seen because, as Strabo says
(Geog. 13.1.38.1–5),
When Troy was overthrown from its foundation all the stones were removed for the reparation
of the other cities.62
It took the modern efforts of Schliemann, Dorpfeld and others, in the nineteenth century, to
recover these stones.63 But it is not stones we look at. As John Ruskin, for example stressed:
The greatest glory of a building is not in its stones, nor in its gold. Its glory is in its Age, and in
that deep sense of voicefullness, of stern watching, of mysterious sympathy, nay even of
approval or condemnation, which we feel in walls that have long been washed by the passing
waves of humanity.64
This ‘deep sense of voicefullness’ of a building is precisely the silence of ruin, but it is
also, for example, the voice given to the ruins of Troy by the single most famous
monument of the ancient world, the poetry of Homer.65 Here we find the walls of Troy and
its many tall towers or indeed, metonymically, ‘the holy citadel of Troy’ (Troieˆs hieron
ptoliethron; pyrgos . . . megas Iliou) in full view.66
The fate of the holy tower and the city of Troy is sealed. It is as certain as the fate of the
proud Oedipus in Sophocles’ Oedipus Rex. ‘We all know,’ as Anselm Kiefer says, ‘that
one day everything will collapse’. Yet Homer’s poetry represents a fundamentally
different narrative choice from the one made by Sophocles. Tragedy gives words to the
downfall. Oedipus is blinded, Agamemnon, Clytemnestra and Antigone all die in the
course of tragic narrative action. In contrast, the destruction of Troy and its walls, its ‘ruin’
– the common noun denotes here both the event and the material remains – are not
described in Homer’s Iliad. Even the Odyssey, although that poem postdates the ‘sheer
destruction’ (aipys olethros), leaves that act and those visions largely beyond the
boundaries of its narrative. Strangely, it is precisely the epic occlusion of destruction that
preserves the ‘perfect visibility’ we might say, of the ruin of Troy within the Iliad and
Odyssey’s ‘voicefullness’.67 Herein within unsaid words lies ‘the antiquity of the ruin’. It
is, it seems to me, an important strand of historical consciousness in antiquity.
We must offer one brief final comment. Our conclusion depends, perhaps
optimistically, on the possibility of ‘translation’, ‘transmission’, or ‘free movement’
between the visible and the articulable. But can we really preserve the visual order of
things in words? As one of the most influential thinkers on the topic, Michel Foucault, says
in Les mots et les choses, ‘it is vain that we say what we see’:68
What we see never resides in what we say. And it is in vain that we attempt to show, by the use
of images, metaphors, or similes, what we are saying; the space where they achieve their
splendour is not that deployed by our eyes but that defined by the sequential elements or
syntax.
Yet in the same breath Foucault adds what might seem like a contradictory statement:
Between the figure and the text we must admit a whole series of crisscrossings, or rather
between the one and the other attacks are launched and arrows fly against the enemy target,
campaigns designed to undermine and destroy, wounds and blows from the lance, a battle . . .
images falling into the midst of words, verbal flashes crisscrossing drawings . . . discourse
cutting into the form of things.
There is, of course, no contradiction here. Gilles Deleuze, one of Foucault’s most
influential exponents, explains:
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The two sorts of text do not in the least contradict each other. The first says that there is no
isomorphism or homology, nor any common form to seeing and speaking, to the visible and
the articulable. The second says that the two forms spill over into one another, as in a battle.
The image of a battle signifies precisely that there is no isomorphism. The two heterogeneous
forms comprise a condition and a conditioned element, light and visibilities, language and
statements; however, the condition does not ‘contain’ the conditioned element but offers it in
a space of dissemination, and offers up itself as a form of exteriority.69
What we possess, then, are precisely the ‘criscrossings’ and ‘battles’, ‘discourse cutting
into the form of things’. Where can we find these battles? In Homer, but also in the work of
Anselm Kiefer, at Ground Zero in New York, and in other ‘piles of debris’ that are, it
seems to me, the ruin.70
Notes
1. Benjamin, Selected Writings, 2: 576.
2. A narrative that is also an un-conscious of place, in the sense provided, for example, by Freud,
when he considers Rome in his Civilization and its Discontents (SE 21 [1927–1931]: 64–148,
or, indeed, in his early notions of archaeology, for example in “Delusions and dreams in
Jensen’s ‘Gradiva.’” (SE 9 [1907]: 1–95).
3. See, for example, Scho¨nle, “Ruins and History: Observations on Russian Approaches to
Destruction and Decay,” 651: “The disintegration wrought on their roughened surface or
grotesque forms sometimes points to a specific history of decay, whether incremental or
catastrophic, and hence offers visible traces of historical derivation.”
4. Peripeteia: Poet. 1452a.2–23; katharsis: Poet. 1449b.24. For the pleasure of ruins see, for
example, Macauley, Pleasure of Ruins; Zucker, “Ruins, An Aesthetic Hybrid.”
5. Cf. Poet. 1450b.25–30.
6. For architectural follies see, for example, the monument to Rousseau at Ermenonville or other
follies which became popular from the eighteenth century and Harries, The Unfinished
Manner: Essays on the Fragment in the Later Eighteenth Century, 92; further bibliography in
Roth, “Irresistible Decay: Ruins Reclaimed,” 22 n. 6. From a different perspective, see partially
restored commemorative ruins like the Frauenkirche in Dresden. Discussion, for example by
Zill, “A True Witness of Transience,” 811–27 in this volume.
7. Cf. Simmel’s classic formulation in “The Ruin,” 261–2.
8. . . . sic tempora verti
cernimus atque illas adsumere robora gentes,
concidere has; sic magna fuit censuque virisque
perque decem potuit tantum dare sanguinis annos,
nunc humilis veteres tantummodo Troia ruinas
et pro divitiis tumulos ostendit avorum.
clara fuit Sparte, magnae viguere Mycenae,
nec non et Cecropis, nec non Amphionis arces.
vile solum Sparte est, altae cecidere Mycenae,
Oedipodioniae quid sunt, nisi nomina, Thebae?
quid Pandioniae restant, nisi nomen, Athenae?
For a discussion see Azzara, “Osservazioni sul sens delle rovine neall cultura antica,” 2–3,
with further references in n. 9, p.10. The passage and its context contain many difficulties. See
Hardie, “The Speech of Pythagoras in Ovid Metamorphoses 15: Empedoclean Epos.”
9. On ruin time see Hetzler, “Causality: Ruin Time and Ruins,” 51: “Ruin time is immanent in a
ruin and this time includes the time when it was first built, that is, the time when it was not a
ruin; the time of its maturation as a ruin.”
10. Gibbon, The History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire, 8: 267. Bracciolini,Historia
de Varietate Fortunae; Gibbon, p. 58, note 51. For a facsimile see http://www.uni-mannheim.
de/mateo/itali/autoren/poggio_itali.html
11. Cf., for example, Ru¨diger Zill, “A True Witness of Transience,” 811–27, Jean-Pierre Vallat,
“He´ritage, me´moire, identite´s. La liste UNESCO du Patrimoine mondial,” 759–81, Salvatore
European Review of History—Revue europe´enne d’histoire 843
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
oy
al 
Ho
llo
wa
y, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 L
on
do
n]
, [
Ah
uv
ia 
Ka
ha
ne
] a
t 0
6:5
6 1
6 J
an
ua
ry
 20
12
 
Settis, “Ne´cessite´ des ruines: les enjeux du classiques” 717–40 and other contributions in this
volume.
12. Anselm Kiefer, “Chute d’Etoiles”, Monumenta 2007 (8 July 2007), Grand Palais. This
exhibition took place next door to the conference from which the present volume evolved
(“Antiquity and the Ruin”, University of London Institute in Paris, 8–10 June 2008). See
Dagen, Sternenfall – Chute d’e´toiles: Anselm Kiefer au Grand Palais – Monumenta 2007;
Hell, “Briefly Noted: The Twin Towers of Anselm Kiefer and the Trope of Imperial Decline.”
For a discussion of other works by Kiefer in this volume see Andreas Wittenburg’s “Les ruines
comme me´moire des crimes du passe´,” in this volume, 799–810.
13. See Hell and Scho¨nle, “Introduction,” 3.
14. See, for example, Davis, Critical Excess: Overreading in Derrida, Deleuze, Levinas, Zˇizˇek,
and Cavell.
15. The association is also prominent in earlier modernity. See, for example, Robert Browning’s
“Love Among the Ruins”: “To distinguish slopes of verdure, certain rills / from the hills /
intersect and give a name to, else they run / into one” and, on its possible material sources, Parr,
“The Site and Ancient City of Browning’s Love among the Ruins.”
16. Physics IV 220a.24–26: ὁ χρόνος ἀριθμός ἐστιν κινήσεως κατὰ τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον,
καὶ συνεχής (συνεχοῦς γάρ), φανερόν. For Aristotle on time see Coope, Time for Aristotle:
Physics IV 10–14.
17. Poet. 1450b.26–30: ὅλον δέ ἐστιν τὸ ἔχον ἀρχὴν καὶ μέσον καὶ τελευτήν. ἀρχὴ δέ ἐστιν ὃ
αὐτὸ μὲν μὴ ἐξ ἀνάγκης μετ᾽ ἄλλο ἐστίν, μετ᾽ ἐκεῖνο δ᾽ ἕτερον πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ γίνεσθαι·
τελευτὴ δὲ τοὐναντίον ὃ αὐτὸ μὲν μετ᾽ ἄλλο πέφυκεν εἶναι ἢ ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἢ ὡς ἐπὶ τὸ πολύ,
μετὰ δὲ τοῦτο ἄλλο οὐδέν·
Beginnings, middles and ends are, of course, causally linked in Aristotle. Such causality
requires separate, extended discussion, but, apart from anything else, it is a way of indicating
fixed linear sequence.
18. The contradiction may have been more pronounced in antiquity. In modern times, “no words”
can imply a silent reading of the (graphic) letters on a page. Evidence suggests that silent
reading was uncommon in antiquity (see Knox, “Silent Reading in Antiquity”; also, for
example, Nietzsche’s general view in Beyond Good and Evil, section 247). The “silence” of
ruins would thus mark the idea of “no words” much more strongly.
19. Hell and Scho¨nle, “Introduction,” 9.
20. See Roth, Lyons and Merewether, Irresistible Decay, inner cover.
21. See the articles in this volume and especially the essay by Catharine Edwards “Imagining
Ruins in Ancient Rome”, 645–61.
22. Οὐδὲν δ᾽ ἴχνος σώζεται τῆς ἀρχαίας πόλεως. εἰκότως· ἅτε γὰρ ἐκπεπορθημένων τῶν
κύκλῳ πόλεων, οὐ τελέως δὲ κατεσπασμένων, ταύτης δ᾽ ἐκ βάθρων ἀνατετραμμένης, οἱ
λίθοι πάντες εἰς τὴν ἐκείνων ἀνάληψιν μετηνέχθησαν.
“Pausanias periodically informs his readers that a city or a village is defunct, ‘in ruins’, yet then
goes on to describe an apparently still functioning sanctuary (or sanctuaries) within it” (Alcock,
Graecia Capta: The Landscapes of Roman Greece, 207, w. table). This apparent paradox slots
comfortably into the conventional argument about the “invisibility” of the past (and a visibility
of the present) among ancient writers.
23. Against modern progressionism in the context of antiquity, see, for example, Williams, Shame
and Necessity.
24. See Lausberg, Orton and Anderson, Handbook of Literary Rhetoric: A Foundation for Literary
Study, 496, section 1133; Laird, “Sounding out Ecphrasis: Art and Text in Catullus 64”; Elsner,
“The Verbal and the Visual: Cultures of Ekphrasis in Antiquity” (and elsewhere in Elsner’s
work). For the modern use of the term see Heffernan, “Ekphrasis and Representation.”
25. Julia Hell and Andreas Scho¨nle, Ruins of Modernity, 9.
26. Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of History,” in Illuminations, 257. Also cited by Richard
Alston, in this volume 697–716. For Benjamin and ruins see Caygill, Walter Benjamin: The
Colour of Experience, 59 (on the Trauershpiel), 146 (on the Arcades project and on Paris);
Rosen, “Walter Benjamin and His Ruins”; Wohlin, Walter Benjamin: An Aesthetic of
redemption; Scho¨nle, “Ruins and History,” 650–1 rightly notes the opposition between
Benjamin’s view of the ruin as an emblem of essential fragmentation, and Simmel’s view of the
ruin as “psychic wholeness.”
A. Kahane844
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [R
oy
al 
Ho
llo
wa
y, 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of
 L
on
do
n]
, [
Ah
uv
ia 
Ka
ha
ne
] a
t 0
6:5
6 1
6 J
an
ua
ry
 20
12
 
27. See Franz Do¨lger, “Zur ΣΟΥΔΑ-Frage”, but recently Hemmerdinger, “‘Suidas,’ et non la
‘Souda’,” 31.
28. Suda, 583.1–4 (Adler): Νυκτικόραξ: εἶδος ὀρνέου ἐρημικοῦ, ὃ τὰς οἰκουμένας φεύγων
τῶν οἰκιῶν ταῖς ἐρήμοις καὶ καταλελυμέναις προστρέχει· τὰ γὰρ οἰκόπεδα ἐρείπιά
φασιν. οὕτω καὶ τὸ στρουθίον δειλὸν ὄρνεον ὂν ὑπὸ ἀγωνίας ἐλαύνει τὸν ὕπνον. For the
purposes of this text I prefer to translate a little differently from, for example, Catharine Roth
(Suda on Line, http://www.stoa.org/sol-bin//search.pl?search_method¼QUERY&login ¼ &
enlogin ¼ &searchstr ¼ nu,583&field ¼ adlerhw_gr&db ¼ REAL). I am grateful to William
Hutton, Catharine Roth and the Suda on Line project for their help.
29. See Adler, Suidae Lexicon vol. 3, Nu 538, and Theodoret of Cyrus’ commentary (PG
80.1677c) on Psalm 101.7 LXX.
30. “A Prayer for one afflicted, when he is faint and pours out his complaint before the face
of Yahweh”: ὡμοιώθην πελεκᾶνι ἐρημικῷ, ἐγενήθην ὡσεὶ νυκτικόραξ ἐν οἰκοπέδῳ,
ἠγρύπνησα καὶ ἐγενήθην ὡσεὶ στρουθίον μονάζον ἐπὶ δώματι. “I am like a desert owl
[pelican ], like an owl [nuktikorax ] among the ruins. I lie awake; I have become like a bird
[strouthion ] alone on a roof.” It is clear from the presentation and the mention of the
strouthion, which appears in the following sentence (583.4) in the Suda, that the Septuagint
text is here the source of the Suda’s tradition, as it is in various other instances (strouthion ¼
“bird,” “sparrow.” The original Hebrew tsippor denotes any small bird, 102.8: דָּמִיתִילִקְאַת
מִדְבָּרהָיִיתִיכְּכוֹסחֳרָבֽוֹת׃שָׁקַדְתִּיוָאֶהְיֶהכְּצִפּוֹרבּוֹדֵדעַל־גָּג׃ ). The exact route by which this text
arrives in the Suda is impossible to trace. As Catharine Roth of the Suda Online informs me
(pers. comm. 29 July 2010) “in the notes we often say something like ‘presumably quoted from
somewhere’”).
31. Compare Aeschrus, Agamemnon, 2–3: κοιμώμενος / στέγαις Ἀτρειδῶν ἄγκαθεν, κυνὸς
δίκην, “lying on the roof like a dog”. Transfer of human sentiment onto an animal embodies
the sense of dislocation and in this case the impending ruin of the “house” of Atreus.
32. The emblem of this Jerusalem is, of course, theWailingWall, the ruined remains of the western
wall of the Temple of Solomon which are meticulously preserved in (Jewish) cultural memory
as well as in material form.
33. The Suda contains much material by way, for example, of biblical proper names (Galaadi
tis ¼ Gilead, Gabao ¼ Gideon), lexical items and more. The reference to Psalms is well
recognised (Adler, Suidae Lexicon, Nu 583).
34. See Huyssen, “Nostalgia for Ruins,” 6–21.
35. Cf. for example, Luka´cs in the opening sentences of Theory of the Novel, 29–30: “Happy are
those ages [in antiquity] when the starry sky is the map of all possible paths . . . Everything in
such ages is new and yet familiar, full of adventure and yet their own. The world is wide and yet
it is like a home . . . the world and the self, the light and the fire, are sharply distinct, yet they
never become permanent strangers to one another . . . ‘Philosophy is really homesickness,’ says
Novalis: ‘it is the urge to be at home everywhere.’ That is why philosophy, as a form of life or as
that which determines the form and supplies the content of literary creation, is always a
symptom of the rift between ‘inside’ and ‘outside’, a sign of the essential difference between the
self and the world, the incongruence of soul and deed. That is why happy ages [of antiquity, for
example] have no philosophy, or why . . . all men in such ages are philosophers . . . When this is
so, passion is the way, predetermined by reason, towards complete self-being and frommadness
come enigmatic yet decipherable messages of a transcendental power, otherwise condemned to
silence. There is not yet any interiority, for there is not yet any exterior, any ‘otherness’ for the
soul. The soul goes out to seek adventure; it lives through adventure, but it does not know the
real torment of seeking and the real danger of finding; such a soul never stakes itself; it does not
yet know that it can lose itself, it never thinks of having to look for itself.”
36. Unlike even the underlying “narrative” of its source, Psalm 101.
37. Cf. the owl’s function as a symbol of Athena and later of the city of Athens (see Shapiro, “From
Athena’s Owl to the Owl of Athens,” 213–24).
38. See above, n. 31.
39. See, for example, Williams and Walker, “Ovid in Exile”; Williams, “Ovid’s Exile Poetry:
Tristia, Epistulae ex Ponto and Ibis,” 233–48; more recently, McGowan, Ovid in Exile: Power
and Poetic Redress in the Tristia and Epistulae ex Ponto.
40. See, for example, Nagy, The Best of the Achaians: Concepts of the Hero in Archaic Greek
Poetry, Ch. 10, “Poetic Visions of Immortality for the Hero,” 175–210.
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41. Cf. Iliad 2.485: ὑμεῖς γὰρ θεαί ἐστε πάρεστέ τε ἴστέ τε πάντα, “you [Muses] are goddesses,
you are present [everywhere] and know everything”. The omnipresence, (implied) infinite
power of vision and (stated) omniscience of the Muses is transferred onto mortal words in the
form of poetry. Comments on image and word in the passage in Kahane, Diachronic
Dialogues: Continuity and Authority in Homer and the Homeric Tradition, 16–17, 26 n. 49.
Catharine Edwards, in this volume, 645–66 says: “In a sense Troy’s fame lies in its ruin – as
Lucan would memorably observe (9.964).”
42. “Ruins signal simultaneously an absence and a presence; they show, they are, an intersection of
the visible and the invisible . . . But their visible presence also points to durability, even if that
which is, is no longer what it once was.” Settis, “Foreword,” in Roth, Lyons and Merewether,
Irresistible Decay, vii.
43. See Zˇizˇek,Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates,
15: “The Wachowski brothers’ hit Matrix (1999) brought this logic to its climax: the material
reality we all experience and see around us is a virtual one, generated and co-ordinated by a
gigantic mega-computer to which we are all attached; when the hero (played by Keanu Reeves)
awakens into ‘real reality’, he sees a desolate landscape littered with burnt-out ruins – what
remains of Chicago [another great city, AK] after global war. . . . Was it not something of a
similar order that took place in New York on September 11? Its citizens were introduced to the
‘desert of the real’.”
44. See also James Porter’s contribution to this volume, “Sublime Monument and Sublime Ruins
in Ancient Aesthetics,” 685–96. For “empty time” see Benjamin, “Theses on the Philosophy of
History,” in Illuminations, (XVIII B), 264.
45. For example, Iliad 11.174, 441; 12.345, etc. Odyssey 1.11, 37; 5.30. The expression aipus
olethros is used a total of 25 times in Homer. Heubeck in Homer’s Odyssey: A Commentary, 1:
73 ad loc., while getting the basic sense right, fails to understand the logic of the phrase:
“αἰπÚς is similarly used metaphorically with φòνος, πòνος and χòλος; though it is not quite
clear what metaphor is presupposed, the general sense seems to be ‘merciless, hard to
overcome’.” See Verdenius, “The Metaphorical Use of ”; LfgrE s.v. aipys.
46. As Merewether, for example says, “ruins collapse temporalities (“Traces of Loss,” in
Irresistible Decay, 25).
47. Commentaries on the Tower are too numerous to list, but see, for example, responses by Primo
Levi (HaKarmi, “Hubris, Language, and Oppression”) and Franz Kafka (comments in Steiner,
After Babel: Aspects of Language and Translation, 69–70).
48. See Ben-Yehuda, Thesaurus Totius Hebraitatis et Veteris et Recentioris, 2: 2778. This
dictionary, now over 100 years old, and problematic at many points, is still an unmatched
source of historical references and perspectives.
49. The verb nafutz, root p-waw-ts ( פוץ ), “be scattered”, “broken”, also denotes the sense of “exile”,
“diaspora” in later usage. See Ben-Yehuda, Thesaurus Totius Hebraitatis, 16: 7849 s.v. tefutza.
50. See a discussion and comments (esp. on Wagner’s views of such scattering) in Andreas
Huyssen, Present Pasts, 44.
51. Kafka “saw in the Tower and its ruin a dramatic shorthand through which to convey certain
exact, though not quite wholly articulate, intimation about man’s linguistic condition and the
relation of that condition to God . . . Rebellion and worship are inextricably mixed [in the
Tower] . . . ” (Steiner, After Babel, 69).
52. Almost every major living thinker has contributed to the discussion on the Twin Towers, of
course, including, for example, Fredric Jameson, Noam Chomsky, Slavoj Zˇizˇek, Paul Virilio
and countless others. I am unaware of “formal” analyseswhich follow the lines suggested below.
53. “What has led the building upward is human will; what gives it its present appearance is the
brute, downward-dragging, corroding crumbling power of nature . . . Nature has transformed
the work of art into material for her own expression, as she had previously served as material
for art” (Simmel, “The Ruin,” 261–2).
54. Yamasaki’s views, in fact, combine technical instrumentality, banal aspiration, and ethical
crassness: “After studying more than one hundred schemes in model form, Yamasaki decided
on a two-tower development to contain the nine million square feet of office space. One tower
became unreasonable in size and unwieldy structurally, yet several towers became too
approximate for their size and ‘looked too much like a housing project’ [sic], whereas two
towers gave a reasonable office area on each floor, took advantage of the magnificent views,
and allowed a manageable structural system. . . . ‘The World Trade Center should,’ Yamasaki
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said, ‘because of its importance, become a living representation of man’s belief in humanity,
his need for individual dignity, his belief in the cooperation of men, and through this
cooperation his ability to find greatness.’” Heyer, Architects on Architecture, 194–5. See also
Yamasaki, A Life in Architecture.
55. Cf. HaKarmi, “Hubris, Language, and Opression.” Franz Kafka referred to the tower as “the pit
of Babel” (See Steiner, After Babel, 70).
56. Note that “the one tower of Babel” ¼ “the two towers of the WTC” ¼ “the City”. The
“arithmetic” of metonymy resists numeric quantification.
57. The Day After Tomorrow (Roland Emmerich, 2004); Asteroid (Bradford May, 1997); Deep
Impact (Mimi Leder, 1998); 2012 (Roland Emmerich, 2009); the Matrix franchise, especially
Matrix Revolutions (Wachowski brothers, 2003) and its closing visage of a post-holocaust
cityscape. For the tower as an enhanced presence in film see, for example, Jameson on the
Westin Bonaventure in LA in The Cultural Turn: Selected Writings on the Postmodern 1983–
1998, 1–20. Further brief comments by Kahane, (“Introduction,” in artist Jaspar Lester-
Joseph’s project, Revisiting the Bonaventure Hotel, 9–10).
58. See Marx, et al., Walter Benjamin’s Archive: Images, Texts, Signs, 177.
59. The pun is almost irresistible: Poggio Bracciolini is the man who stands on the “hill” ( poggio)
watching the past . . .
60. Roth, Irresistible Decay, inside front cover.
61. Roth, Irresistible Decay, inside front cover.
62. See above, n. 19.
63. See Latacz, Troy and Homer: Towards a Solution of an Old Mystery.
64. Ruskin, The Seven Lamps of Architecture, 172.
65. Cf., for example, Nagy, Greek Myth and Poetics, 222: “The entire Iliad is a seˆma reinforcing
the will of Zeus.” Also, Grethlein, “Memory and Material Objects in the Iliad and the Odyssey,
Journal of Hellenic Studies”: “there is a juxtaposition here of epic poetry and the ‘archaeology
of the past’ as two different media of memory.”
66. Cf. e.g. Odyssey 1.2: Τροίης ἱερὸν πτολίεθρον. Grethlein (“Memory and Material Remains,”
35) cites Andrew Ford who sees the wall as “a figure for a written-down Iliad” (Ford, Homer:
Poetry of the Past, 150).
67. See Bakker and Kahane, Written Voices, Spoken Signs.
68. Foucault, The Order of Things, 9, cited in Deleuze, Foucault, 56.
69. Deleuze, Foucault, 56.
70. I am grateful to William Hutton, James Porter, Pietro Pucci, Catharine Roth, Andreas
Wittenburg, James Bradburne for helpful comments.
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